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Philadelphia Bulletin

McCloy Gets Brushoff On Russian Escapes

By DREW PEARSON

a Route Through Europe, Aug. —Here are some spot observa- ons gathered in various parts of Germany regarding one of the most important problems we face either in preventing war or winning a war after it gets started:

Frankfurt — High Commissioner John McCloy, who is performing a remarkably fine job, is supposed to be the top man in Germany. He can and does set aside German court decrees. He can give or withhold American money, the lifeblood of Europe. He can order the American Army to get out of this area or into that.

But when it comes to Russians who have escaped from behind the Iron Curtain, McCloy has as much influence with the American Army as a Communist youth demonstrator in the east zone of Germany. The American military flouts his orders and thumbs its nose at McCloy much like the above Communist youth demonstrator at the West German police.

Perhaps because of this, the young socialite agents in the Central Intelligence Agency of General Bedell Smith and the amateur detectives in the Counter-Intelligence Corps do such a successful job of alienating these Russian escapees that a lot of them decide Russia is better than the much-vaunted West and return home.

Just outside Frankfurt is a Russian refugee camp. Its name, its exact location, the number of Russians in it are supposed to be top secret. Not even McCloy knows how many Russians are in it. Nor has he ever visited it. If the Army is ordered by McCloy to let anyone into this camp, the Army says no.

Anxious to Help U. S.

In this camp at one time were about 2,000 Russian officers, who, disgusted with the Red army, had fled to the American zone of Germany anxious to help the U.S.A. But for months they simply sat, ate and were interviewed by young Counter-Intelligence agents—ate, sat, and were interviewed; ate, slept and were interviewed.

Some were flown to the United States amid a flurry of excitement to report on conditions inside Russia to higherups in the Pentagon. Some were promised haven in the U.S.A. In the end all were reduced to sitting, waiting and going to seed —thanks to the sterility, inefficiency and lack of imagination of the Army and General Bedell Smith's amateur Dick Tracys.

Berlin—Across the invisible Iron Curtain in the east zone of Germany are about 300,000 members of the Red army. Living in Germany, a country with which they all too recently fought a bitter war, these troops long had to camp behind barbed wire.

This was not to keep the German population away from them, but to keep the Russians from deserting. Even so, many of them did desert—more would desert if given encouragement or any kind of favorable treatment after their arrival in the west.

Russian Weakness

Obviously Moscow knows that these troops, living near the West and with no tight border control between East and West, constitute one of the potential weaknesses of the Red army. It also knows that the same thing is true in Austria where Russian troops also live near the West and temptation is strong to drift over and sample Western glamor.

Munich — Dining in Munich the other night I discussed some of these things with gnarled, spritely Alexander Kerensky, father of the first Russian revolution, who, if not upset by Lenin and Trotsky, might have saved Russia and the world from the scourge of Communism.

Kerensky had come to Munich to do a job that has needed doing for years — wrapping all the diverse Russian exile groups into one close-knit body in order to do to Stalin what Lenin and Trotsky once did to Kerensky.

In Munich with Kerensky were three other top Russians from the U. S. A. — Vladamir Zenzinov, Professor I. Kurganov and Boris Nikolayevsky; also the League of Struggle for National Freedom, the National Labor Alliance, the Russian National Movement, the Union of Soldiers of the Liberation Movement, and the Union for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia.

Diverse Group

These groups and leaders are about as diverse as and difficult to get along with as some of the groups within the heterogeneous Union of Soviet Russia; and some, such as the Ukraines, want to solve all "new Russia's" problems even before the new Russia is created. However, it seemed to me that in Munich is the most encouraging thing that has happened for a long time. For if and when they get together, they can do two things:

1. Beam propaganda into Russia that comes from Russians, not from Americans who have an ax to grind.

2. Work out a system for screening recent Russian escapees and getting them settled where they can help in the future; instead of going to seed in refugee camps under the amateur cross-examination of CIA and CIC boys.

Note — At present there is no more co-operation between Counter-Intelligence and Russians of the Kerensky type than there is between McCloy and Counter-Intelligence.

Prediction — If the United States arranges with Brazil, Paraguay, Kenya, South Africa and other underpopulated countries to set up a system for handling Russian refugees, and if word of this were broadcast to the Red army in East Germany and Austria, I predict that it would be impossible for the Kremlin to keep an army in these two vital countries. Such a refugee resettlement plan could be a Point Four program which might save the peace of the world.—(© 1951)

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